Synaptic plasticity is widely considered to be the neurobiological 6 basis of learning and memory by neuroscientists and researchers in 7 adjacent fields, though diverging opinions are increasingly being recog-8 nised. From the perspective of what we might call "classical cognitive 9 science" it has always been understood that the mind/brain is to be 10 considered a computational-representational system. Proponents of the 11 information-processing approach to cognitive science have long been 12 critical of connectionist or network approaches to (neuro-)cognitive 13 architecture, pointing to the shortcomings of the associative psychology 14 that underlies Hebbian learning as well as to the fact that synapses 15 are practically unfit to implement symbols. Recent work on memory 16 has been adding fuel to the fire and current findings in neuroscience 17 now provide first tentative neurobiological evidence for the cognitive 18 scientists' doubts about the synapse as the (sole) locus of memory 19 in the brain. This paper briefly considers the history and appeal of 20 synaptic plasticity as a memory mechanism, followed by a summary of 21 the cognitive scientists' objections regarding these assertions. Next, a 22 variety of tentative neuroscientific evidence that appears to substan-23 tiate questioning the idea of the synapse as the locus of memory is 24 presented. On this basis, a novel way of thinking about the role of 25 synaptic plasticity in learning and memory is proposed. 26 However, diverging opinions are increasingly being recognised (e.g., Dudai 30 et al., 2015; Poo et al., 2016).
Introduction 27
Synaptic plasticity is widely considered to provide the neurobiological basis 28 of learning and memory by neuroscientists and researchers in adjacent fields. 29 objections to this idea. Next, a variety of tentative neuroscientific evidence 48 that appears to substantiates questioning the idea of the synapse as the locus 49 of memory is considered. On this basis, a novel way of thinking about the role 50 of synaptic plasticity in learning and memory-mentioned only in passing in 51 a recent commentary (Trettenbrein, 2015) -is proposed. 52 2 A tentative idea with an intuitive appeal 53 It was Ramón y Cajal who first concluded from his studies of bird brains 54 that neurons touch one another yet remain separate entities; Sherrington 55 later coined the term "synapse" to refer to the microscopic gap between 56 individual nerve cells (Glickstein, 2014) . Subsequently, the psychologist 57 Donald Hebb made the at first merely theoretical proposal that changes 58 in synaptic connectivity and strength might constitute the fundamental 59 mechanism for information storage in the brain. It it interesting to note that 60 Ramón y Cajal had, in a way, anticipated this conceptual move when he noted 61 that " [. . . ] interneuronal connectivity [. . . ] is susceptible to being influenced 62 and modified during youthful years by education and habits" (Delgado-García, 63 2015, p. 6). As of today, the general idea that learning is essentially the 64 modification of synapses in an ever-changing plastic brain (a problematic 65 notion; see Delgado-García and Gruart, 2004; Delgado-García, 2015) has 66 become one of the dogmas of modern neuroscience and is usually presented in 67 2 popular science as well as in the scientific literature proper as an established 68 fact and "generally accepted" (Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2007) . 69 The fundamental principle of Hebb's ideas on learning and memory was 70 later poignantly summarised by Shatz as " [. . . ] cells that fire together wire 71 together" (1992) . Hebb himself more elaborately suggested that 72 [w]hen an axon of cell A is near enough to excite cell B and 73 repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth 74 process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such 75 that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased. (Hebb 76 as cited in Glickstein, 2014, p. 253) 77 While these ideas about synaptic plasticity originally were purely theoretical 78 in nature they have long-since been confirmed experimentally with the dis-79 covery of long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) as 80 complementary neurobiological mechanisms.
81
In this context, it is important to point out the crucial role that (cognitive) 82 psychology and its philosophical predecessors have played in this overall 83 development. Not only was Hebb himself an early neuropsychologist trained 84 by Karl Lashley, his idea that learning occurs whenever two cells fire together 85 is clearly reminiscent of Lockean associative psychology which, in turn, can be 86 traced back in the history of ideas all the way to Aristotle. This associative 87 aspect of Hebbian learning has an intuitive appeal, as Gallistel and King 88 (2009) recount tongue-in-cheek: How else could you explain that if you hear 89 "salt" you will probably also think "pepper?" Associationism has come in 90 different flavors since the days of Skinner, but they all share the fundamental 91 aversion towards internally adding structure to contingencies in the world 92 (Gallistel and Matzel, 2013) . Crucially, it is only against this background of 93 association learning that LTP and LTD seem to provide a neurobiologically 94 as well as psychologically plausible mechanism for learning and memory. 
107
Pavlov himself already knew that the associative strength between two 108 stimuli is determined by a multitude of experimental aspects in combination, 109 meaning that all the different variables are encoded in a single association.
110
In order to read information from memory it would be necessary to know 111 about the mapping rules employed when writing that information to memory.
112
However, in such a scenario where a variety of different variables have been 113 mixed and encoded in a single association it is mathematically impossible 114 to determine the value of any of the variables that entered into the original 115 calculation: Mathematically speaking, association is a many-one function so 116 that Pavlov's goal of discovering general "laws of association" cannot be met.
117
Instead, in order to regain useful information from associative strengths, it is 118 necessary to assume that there are different mapping rules (i.e. neurobiological 119 processes) for every synapse. It stands to reason that this is an unpleasant 120 assumption which runs counter to Pavlov's intent.
121
Furthermore, Hebbian learning rests on the idea that the neuron is the basic 122 unit of information processing in the brain only by virtue of its connectivity argument for an understanding of the mind/brain as being Turing complete.
144
(In this context, see table 1 for working definitions of key terms.) Needless to 145 say, Gallistel and King's original argument is by far more detailed than the 146 sketch that I can provide here, yet the main points should surface and will 147 hopefully suffice for further treatment.
148
Once we reconsider the classical cognitive scientist's conception of the 149 mind/brain as a computational-representational system it is evident that the 150 brain must adhere to the abstract architectural properties of a universal Turing 151 machine, meaning that it is capable of universal computation. This, of course, 152 is not to say that the brain must resemble von Neumann's implementation of 153 a Turing machine, but that it nevertheless seems to adhere to the abstract 154 properties of a Turing machine. Crucially, as David Marr put it, " [v] iewing 155 our brains as information-processing devices is not demeaning [. . . ]" (2010, 156 p. 361). It might be the case that the brain is capable of carrying out 157 computations that a Turing machine cannot compute, but we do not know 158 whether this is the case nor how the brain might achieve this feat.
159
Provided that the cognitive functions exhibited by human brains require 160 the capabilities of Turing machines, one could quickly be led to a Scala 161 Naturae interpretation of the evolution of computational abilities of nervous 162 systems. Humans seem to be generalists, whereas animal learning is usually 163 seen as highly domain-specific (e.g., Gallistel, 1999) . Thus, one might be led 164 to conclude that only human brains are capable of universal computation.
165
In fact, some have made this exact claim with regard to human language 166 capacities (e.g., Steedman, 2014). However, this would clearly be a mistake, 167 as it is now understood that even insect navigation already requires the 168 capabilities of a Turing machine (Gallistel, 1998; Gallistel and King, 2009 ). In The crucial feature of a Turing machine is its memory component: the 172 (hypothetical) machine must possess a read/write memory in order to be 173 vastly more capable than a machine that remembers the past only by changing 174 the state of the processor, as does, for example, a finite-state machine without 175 read/write memory. Thus, there must be an efficient way of storing symbols 176 in memory (i.e. writing), locating symbols in memory (i.e. addressing), and 177 transporting symbols to the computational machinery (i.e. reading). It is 178 exactly this problem, argue Gallistel and King (2009), that has by and large 179 been overlooked or ignored by neuroscientists.
180
Now, when we are looking for a mechanism that implements a read/write 181 memory in the nervous system, looking at synaptic strength and connectivity 182 patterns might be misleading for many reasons. Most pressingly, as Gallistel In the final analysis, however, our skepticism rests most strongly 186 on the fact that the synapse is a circuit-level structure, a structure 187 that it takes two different neurons and a great many molecules 188 to realize. It seems to us likely for a variety of reasons that the 189 elementary unit in the memory mechanism will prove to be a 190 molecular or sub-molecular structural unit. (2009, p. 282) 191 Hence, they suggest turning to DNA and RNA, which already implement the 
197
A mechanism as essential as memory has to be efficient in all respects, be 198 it implementational complexity or energy efficiency. Another part of Gallistel 199 and collaborators' argument for the point of view they put forward is the 200 observation that neural computation is demonstrably incredibly fast, therefore 201 making it much more likely that the memory mechanism is (sub-)molecular 202 in nature so that computational machinery and memory can be located in 203 close physical proximity in order to minimize the distance over which a signal 204 has to be transmitted (a process which evidently is "slow" in the nervous 205 system in comparison to, for example, conventional computers). To this day, tentative evidence for the (classical) cognitive scientists' reserva-208 tions towards the synapse as the locus of memory in the brain has accumulated.
209
A lot of groundbreaking work concerning the way in which the brain carries tions. Yet, the more puzzling finding of their studies is that synaptic spines 261 7 were found to be still turning over at a rather high rate in absence of learning.
262
As a matter of fact, the rate of synaptic turnover in absence of learning is 263 actually so high that the newly formed connections (which supposedly encode 264 the new memory) will have vanished in due time. It is worth noticing that 265 these findings actually are to be expected when considering that synapses are 266 made of proteins which are generally known to have a short lifetime.
267
Nevertheless, the observation that synapses are turning over at a high 268 rate even in absence of learning, of course, is paradoxical. Interestingly, this or we might conclude that the widely presumed relation between synaptic 288 conductance and connectivity and memory is not as direct as conventional 289 wisdom would have it. Provided that there is some merit to the idea that 290 brain's memory mechanism might be localized to neurons' somata, a separation 291 between learning and memory seems indicated. associative LTP/LTD as the putative basis for learning and memory.
300
A good example is spatial learning which is crucially dependent on hip-301 pocampus (Bannerman et al., 1995; Martin and Morris, 2002) . Without going 302 into great detail here, it can be said that the production of LTP (though 303 not its maintenance) has been shown to crucially depend on N -methyl-D-304 aspartate (NMDA) receptors located in the dentritic spine of the postsynaptic 305 neuron (Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2007; Siegelbaum et al., 2013) . It thus follows have shown that pretraining can actually "compensate" for pharmacological 311 blocking of NDMA receptors so that animals perform (close to) normal.
312
Otherwise put, when animals were pretrained in navigating in one water 313 maze they could readily learn to navigate in a second one despite the chemical 314 blocking of LTP. This might be interpreted as to indicate that NMDA receptors 315 do play a role in initial learning of a new skill (i.e. navigating a maze) but do 316 not appear to play any role in altering the specifics, or maybe better 'contents,' 317 for example, when a new map is added to memory, respectively when the 318 already existing representation is being updated. Provided that blocking of 319 NMDA receptors did not prevent the acquisition of new information it seems 320 reasonable to purport that a memory mechanism other than LTP was at 321 work here, thought the nature of this mechanism remains unknown. All in 322 all, we might take this as an indication for a dissociation of (spatial) learning 323 and the memory mechanism(s) as such, an interpretation that has abundant 324 representational implications (see also Gallistel and Matzel, 2013) . 325 We might now once again turn to (classical) cognitive science and consider 326 these findings against the backdrop that learning is highly domain-specific 327 (e.g., Chomsky, 1975; Gallistel, 1999) : An information-processing perspective 328 on the mind/brain necessarily leads to the postulation of domain-specific 329 learning mechanisms. Hence, based on the above-mentioned studies we might 330 postulate that the (spatial) learning mechanism is only partially dependent 331 on synaptic plasticity. Acquisition of the skill relies on synaptic plasticity 332 and thus a process of neural reorganisation, whereas altering the specifics 333 (i.e. acquisition of new information, respectively "updating" of information 334 already stored in memory) does not. It follows that LTP and thus synaptic 335 plasticity cannot provide the brain's basic memory mechanism.
336
In the sense of Gallistel and King (2009), learning is the process of extract-337 ing information from the environment, whereas memorizing is the processes 338 of storing this information in a manner that is accessible to computation. 339 9 It is interesting to note that once learning and memory are conceived of as 340 separate processes, the above-mentioned observation that synaptic spines are 341 still turning over at a very high rate in absence of learning does no longer 342 pose such a severe problem. In somewhat similar fashion, we can interpret 343 the findings of Ryan et al. (2015) against this background, so that we might 344 say that in their study information was extracted from the environment (i.e. 345 learning occurred) and stored in memory independently of the process of 346 memory consolidation, that is alteration of synaptic weights and connectivity.
347
Lastly, all of this is not to say that synaptic plasticity and networks are of The realization that the synapse is probably an ill fit when looking for a 360 basic memory mechanism in the nervous system does not entail that synaptic 361 plasticity should be deemed irrelevant. Quite to the contrary, there of course 362 is ample and convincing evidence that synaptic plasticity is a prerequisite for 363 many forms of learning (see e.g., Martin and Morris, 2002; Münte et al., 2002; 364 Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2007; Jäncke, 2009; Dudai et al., 2015; Ryan et al., 365 2015; Poo et al., 2016) . However, it occurs to me that we should seriously 366 consider the possibility that the observable changes in synaptic weights and 367 connectivity might not so much constitute the very basis of learning as they 368 are the result of learning.
369
This is to say that once we accept the conjecture of Gallistel and collabo-370 rators that the study of learning can and should be separated from the study 371 of memory to a certain extent, we can reinterpret synaptic plasticity as the 372 brain's way of ensuring a connectivity and activity pattern that is efficient 373 and appropriate to environmental and internal requirements within physical 374 and developmental constraints. Consequently, synaptic plasticity might be 375 understood as a means of regulating behavior (i.e. activity and connectivity 376 patterns) only after learning has already occurred. In other words, synaptic 377 10 weights and connections are altered after relevant information has already 378 been extracted from the environment and stored in memory.
379
Over roughly the last decade, evidence that supports such an interpretation 380 has been piling up, suggesting that the brain is (close to) "optimally wired."
381
It seems that axons and dendrites are close to the smallest possible length, 382 at least within a cortical column (Chklovskii et al., 2002; Chklovskii, 2004) 383 and possibly also globally (Cherniak et al., 2004; Lewis et al., 2012; Sporns, 384 2012). As noted by Chklovskii et al., this "optimality" has further pressing 385 implications for the idea that the synapse is the locus of memory, after all, 386 [. . . ] an increased number of synapses could not be accommodated 387 without degrading performance in some way because the cortex is 388 already optimally wired in the sense that the number of synapses 389 is already maximal (2002, p. 345) .
390
The role of synaptic plasticity thus changes from providing the funda-391 mental memory mechanism to providing the brain's way of ensuring that 392 its wiring diagram enables it to operate efficiently with regard to environ-393 mental and internal pressures. Viewed against the background that synapses 394 are practically unfit to implement the cognitive scientists' beloved symbols, 395 it seems that we seriously have to consider that synaptic plasticity might 396 not implement a memory mechanism as such. Instead, changes in synaptic 397 conductance and connectivity might provide a bundle of mechanisms which 398 regulate and ensure that the network and its modules perform and interact 399 efficiently.
400
In this regard, it is vital to note that while cognitive science tells us 401 that learning is domain-specific, these observations unfortunately cannot 402 tell us whether the basic memory mechanism is rather uniform or not. An 403 evolutionary argument could be put forward in favour of a view where the basic 404 memory mechanisms is highly conserved, but such a theory has not yet been 405 confirmed to facts. If memory actually turns out to be sub-cellular in nature, 406 synaptic plasticity would of course not be rendered irrelevant. However, what 407 would change is the function commonly attributed to synapses: For example, 408 one possibility is that synapses could be understood as providing "access points" 409 to information already stored in memory inside the cell (Ryan et al., 2015) , 410 instead of a way of carrying forward information in time. Memories stored in 411 cells could thus possibly be considered to be synapse-specific, meaning that 412 activating different synapses will elicit different events in the cell. To sum up, it can be said that when it comes to answering the question of how 415 information is carried forward in time in the brain we remain largely clueless. 416 Fittingly, in a recent autobiographical account of his research, scientific career, 417 and personal life, Michael Gazzaniga commented on the current problems 418 of (cognitive) neuroscience, concluding that "[. . . ] neuroscience still has not 419 collected the key data because, to some extent, it is not known what that key 420 data even is" (Gazzaniga, 2015, p. 190) .
421
Apparently, very much as Marr (2010) envisioned, the "classical" cognitive 422 scientist's analysis of the information-processing problem at stake in the study 423 of memory now has yielded first hints with regard to where neurobiologists 424 should be looking for this key data when studying the brain's fundamental 425 memory mechanism(s): inside the cell. Tentative evidence from a wide variety 426 of work in neuroscience seems to provide support for the idea that the synapse 427 is an ill fit when looking for the brain's basic memory mechanism: memory 428 persists despite synapses having been destroyed and synapses are turning over 429 at very high rates even when nothing is being learned. All things considered, 430 the case against synaptic plasticity is convincing, but it should be emphasised 431 that we are currently also still lacking a coherent alternative.
432
Adolphs (2015) optimistically listed the problem of how learning and 433 memory work among those that he expects to be solved by neuroscientists 434 within the next 50 years. We shall see how this turns out, but, if anything, 435 the evidence and recent findings discussed here seem to indicate to me that we 436 will have to rethink many of the basic propositions in the cognitive sciences 437 and especially neuroscience in order to actually achieve this. Yet, it is not 438 at all implausible that in the years to come we might see the paradigm shift 439 that Gallistel and Balsam (2014) have been calling for.
Term
Exposition finite-state machine An abstract machine that can be in only one state at a time and a finite number of states in total. Its memory is defined by the number states available. Turing machine A finite-state machine extended with a so-called tape. The tape is a read/write memory component where symbols can be stored and recovered. Turing completeness Refers to the ability of a given set of instructions to simulate a Turing machine. von-Neumann implementation Denotes a common schematic circuit concept (and its many offshoots) that actually implement a universal Turing machine. Table 1 : Nomenclature. This table provides brief expositions of terms and concepts from theory of computation that might not be familiar to all readers. Note that these are working definitions for the purpose of this paper, they are not meant to be exhaustive.
